Differential Tariffs, Negative Value-Added and the Theory of Effective Protection by TAN, Augustine H. H.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
3-1970
Differential Tariffs, Negative Value-Added and the
Theory of Effective Protection
Augustine H. H. TAN
Singapore Management University, ahhtan@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the International Economics Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TAN, Augustine H. H.. Differential Tariffs, Negative Value-Added and the Theory of Effective Protection. (1970). American Economic
Review. 60, (1), 107-116. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/4
 ifferential Tariffs, Negative Value-
 Added and the Theory of
 Effective Protection
 BY AUGUSTINE H. H. TAN*
 The theory of effective protection (EP),
 as developed' by W. M. Corden (1966) and
 Harry Johnson, rests on the two critical
 assumptions of Leontief production co-
 efficients and partial equilibrium.2 Recent
 attempts by James Leith, Benton Massell,
 and Seija Naya and James Anderson to
 relax the assumption of fixed coefficients
 have all been in partial equilibrium terms.
 In this article, we examine some of the
 implications for EP theory of allowing
 variable factor proportions and general
 equilibrium repercussions. It is shown that,
 under such conditions, (a) EP rankings do
 not necessarily provide any index of eco-
 nomic efficiency even when negative value-
 added occurs (Sections I and II); (b) EP
 rates do not necessarily measure the max-
 imum proportionate increase in factor re-
 wards (Sections III and IV); and (c) EP
 rankings do not unambiguously indicate
 the direction of resource flows3 (Section V).
 I. An Economic Interpretation of
 Negative Value-Added
 The setting of our problem is an economy
 with a structure of differential protection
 such that consumption goods are heavily
 protected while material (intermediate)
 imports come in with little or no nominal
 protection (construed to be tariffs or
 quotas, or both). The economy has little or
 no monopoly power in international trade,
 so that external prices are fixed. Such an
 economy is characteristic of many less
 developed countries. (See McKinnon, p.
 585.) We assume that the economy has
 adjusted to the tariff structure, and that
 the exchange rate is fixed. Let each in-
 dustry, i, whose value-added we want to
 measure be in competitive equilibrium
 with a constant returns to scale production
 function, earning zero or normal profits.
 Each factor of production is paid its mar-
 ginal product, assumed to be the same
 everywhere. Domestic product prices are
 fixed by the small country assumption and
 the given product tariff.
 Let us then denote gross output of in-
 dustry i by Zi, and the corresponding pro-
 duction function as
 * The material for this article is from a chapter of my
 doctoral dissertation. I am deeply indebted to Ronald I.
 McKinnon who, as teacher, scholar, and advisor
 exemplar, gave me his ideas so generously that he can
 rightfully claim joint authorship. T. N. Srinivasan gave
 me very helpful comments as did members of the
 Despres-McKinnon international economics seminar at
 Stanford University. I have also benefited from M.
 Aoki's comments.
 The major support for the research came from the
 Agricultural Development Council, Inc., New York;
 further funds and facilities were provided by the Re-
 search Center in Economic Growth, Stanford Univer-
 sity. I am in debt to all concerned. However, I retain
 sole responsibility for all deficiencies, errors, and heresies.
 1 V. K. Ramaswami and T. N. Srinivasan's paper is a
 further development of the point about resource al-
 location made in the present article. Corden's forth-
 coming paper and my January 1969 paper have re-
 cently put EP theory, with fixed coefficients, into a
 general equilibrium framework.
 W. P. Travis' paper, although dealing with general
 equilibrium repercussions, does not make the points
 raised here.
 2 Although Corden (1966) raises some general equilib-
 rium issues here and there, he does not have a consistent
 model for the purpose. The use of only one primary
 factor presents problems of knife-edged instability.
 3 These findings throw into doubt other claims
 based on EP rates, such as comparative advantage
 rankings made, for example, by Bela Balassa and
 Daniel Schvdlowskv.
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 (1) Z; = Zj(B1, B2 ... Bn; MI, M2. .. Mr)
 where the Bi's refer to primary factors and
 the Mi's are intermediate inputs. For sim-
 plicity, but without any loss of generality,
 we dispense with all but one intermediate
 input, M, and one domestic factor, B.
 Consider the conventional measure of
 value-added:
 (2) W iZ;- PmM
 Value-added, W;, is defined as gross
 value of output, P,Zi less the value of in-
 termediate input, PmM.
 Since we are dealing with a small
 country, external prices denoted with as-
 terisks are fixed; then, if no tariff is re-
 dundant:
 (3) P= = (1 + t)P,*
 and
 The price of Zi is one plus t times its
 world price, where t is the ad valorem
 tariff rate. Letting intermediate input in
 duty free, Pm= Pm*, amounts to differ-
 ential protection.
 Consider then the procedure underlying
 empirical measures of value-added in world
 prices. Data on Zi and M are obtained to-
 gether with world prices, actual or im-
 puted, and the following value-added in
 world prices, W is computed:
 (4) Wi = Pi - PmM
 Recalling our price relationships (3) we
 can then write:
 (5) W* = P,Z;-P;M(1 + t)
 Comparing Wi and W.* from equations
 (2) and (5) we can readily see that W,*
 may be negative, depending on the mag-
 nitude of M and t, while Wi, domestic
 value-added may be positive. Therefore,
 value-added, measured in world prices
 may be negative.4 Ihe question then is:
 what is the economic inference that should
 be drawn from this empirical observation?
 Equation (5), if it is negative, appears to
 tell us that in terms of foreign exchange,
 we are throwing money down the drain if
 the industry is allowed to operate. How-
 ever, the following analysis will demon-
 strate that this could be a highly mislead-
 ing, in fact, erroneous interpretation. In
 the first place, equation (5) is not an equi-
 librium observation; it will be shown that
 efficient, indeed optimal, behavior of in-
 dividual industries under constraints pro-
 vided by a differential tariff policy may
 easily lead to measured negative value-
 added in world prices.
 Consider the horizontal line AA in Fig-
 ure 1. This line is defined by the material
 equivalent5 of a unit of output under world
 prices, given by the distance OA, where M
 assumes the value,
 **
 m
 That is, M* denotes the amount of material
 that may be obtained by exchanging one
 unit of output under world prices.
 Similarly, the material equivalent of a
 unit of output under domestic prices is
 given by the distance OH (line HH), where
 M assumes the value:
 4The phenomenon of value-added turning negative
 when measured in world prices seems to be prevalent in
 many less developed countries using differential protec-
 tion as a means of fostering industrialiation. See Ronald
 Soligo and Joseph Stern. Various explanations of such
 observations range from the existence of gross economic
 inefficiency to the arguments by Giorgio Basevi
 (p. 150), and Paul Ellsworth (p. 401), that such results
 are absurd. The only paper offering the economic ra-
 tionale, though without elaboration, is by Stephen Lewis
 and Steve Guisinger.
 It should be noted that the purpose is not to deny the
 validity of arguments based on economic inefficiency;
 rather it is to highlight the adjustments necessitated by
 changes in the price regime and the consequences of
 variability in input coefficients.
 6 I am indebted to Paul David's papers (1962, 1966)
 in developing the arguments around the concept of ma-
 terial equivalent of a unit of output.
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 It should be noted that neither OA nor
 OH in Figure 1 denote actual material in-
 put. The introduction of the notion of
 material equivalents of a unit of output
 allows us to bring in output price levels into
 the analysis. Material input thus serves
 as a convenient numeraire.
 Without loss of generality, we can nor-
 malize world prices to one:
 PM = Pm = 1
 Then, assuming no redundancy in the
 tariff,
 Pi = 1 + t
 We can therefore write the material
 equivalents of a unit of output as:
 HH: Mt = 1 + t, domestic price regime
 A A: M* = 1, world price regime
 Now, consider a point such as d in Fig-
 ure 1. Point d gives us positive value-added
 in domestic prices because the amount of
 material used is less than HH. In terms of
 world prices, however, d represents neg-
 ative value-added because the amount of
 material used is greater than the material
 equivalent of a unit of output in world
 prices, i.e. d is above AA. But what does
 the point d represent? In competitive equi-
 librium, it is the resultant of the marginal
 equivalences between the unit isoquant and
 prices of output and of inputs, the latter
 defined with respect to the domestic price
 regime. Therefore, point d is not an equi-
 librium observation with respect to world
 prices. The correct interpretation of the
 measured negative value-added as repre-
 sented by point d depends on the level of
 analysis and type of policy being con-
 sidered.
 Case 1
 Suppose the industry being considered is
 a small economic unit, such that a change
 110 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
 in policy, relevant only to this industry, has
 no factor price or other repercussions. It
 is in equilibrium at point d, with HD yield-
 ing the internal factor-price ratio. Under
 cost minimization, it is just breaking even
 with the given prices of output, imported
 material, and the domestic factor. Consi-
 dler this industry in the absence of its out-
 put tariff protection. The resulting de-
 crease in product price may be represented
 in Figure 1, by moving from IIH to AA,
 the world price material equivalent of a unit
 of output. Since no factor-price changes
 are induced by the tariff removal, the
 relevant factor-price line becomes AD',
 which is parallel to LID. This means, of
 course, that the industry must go out of
 business upon removal of its tariff protec-
 tion, since it would then find it impossible
 to cover unit costs of production.
 Case 2
 Next, consider the case of a small in-
 dustry such as in Case 1. However, the
 policy change contemplated is a revamping
 of the entire, or a substantial portion of
 the tariff structure. This will then mean
 that relative factor-material prices will be
 altered. (See Section III.) Suppose that
 along with the aggregate tariff changes, the
 tariff for our industry is removed. Then,
 as in Case 1, we move down from HH to
 AA. Factor-material price changes, how-
 ever, could be in either direction, i.e., the
 domestic factor could become dearer or
 cheaper. In Figure 1, AF represents an in-
 crease in the price of domestic factor, B.
 Given the usual convexity properties of the
 isoquant, for the industry to be viable
 under the new tariff policy, the domestic
 factor has to be sufficiently cheaper. The
 price line AC, for instance, satisfies this re-
 quiremnent with equilibrium point g being
 attained. The line AE, though representing
 a cheapening of the domestic factor, does
 not allow unit costs to be covered. A
 fortiori, price line AF indicates nonvia-
 bility without protectioIn.
 Therefore, in Case 2, with a small in-
 dustry faced with a significant policy
 change, it is possible for the industry to be
 economically viable without protection, even
 though it displays measured negative value-
 added in terms of world prices.
 Case 3
 A third possible case is that of an in-
 dustry which is significant enough such
 that a change in its rate of protection will
 generate some relative material factor-
 price change. A reduction of protection to
 this industry, with no changes in rates of
 protection in other industries, will lead to
 a contraction of the industry, decreasing
 its demand for the domestic factor. The
 industry will continue functioning so long
 as the domestic factor becomes sufficiently
 cheap to allow the industry to cover unit
 costs, e.g. point g in Figure 1.
 Case 4
 Next, consider the general version of
 Case 3 where the industry is big enough to
 affect domestic factor prices but such re-
 percussions depend on changes in the rates
 of protection in other industries as well.
 Again, in this case, as for Case 2, (with
 the exception that the factor intensity of
 the industry in Case 4 is relevant to factor-
 price changes), the domestic factor may
 become cheaper or dearer when the policy
 change of, say, removing the industry's
 tariff protection, is instituted. The relevant
 material factor price line may be AF, AE,
 or AC. A F and A E represent nonviability,
 as in Case 2. However, if the price line is
 AC, with equilibrium point g, the industry
 will continue functioning.6
 What about those industries displaying
 positive value-added in world prices? Our
 analysis suggests that analogous consider-
 ations apply. Just as measured negative
 value-added in world prices should create
 6 The analysis can be extended to cover questions of
 tariff redundancy, unimputed surplus, and a tariff on
 mnaterial imports without altering the conclusions.
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 no undue presumption of the industry
 being nonviable under world prices (except
 for Case 1), measured positive value-added
 in world prices should not create a presump-
 tion of viability under world prices, either
 (Case 1 not excepted). It is easily seen that
 for Case 1, measured positive value-added
 in world prices is no guarantee of viability
 under world prices-only when the point
 d coincides with the point g will the in-
 dustry continue functioning under world
 prices. But, this will happen only if the tariff
 was completely redundant initially. Thus,
 for all practical purposes, and in the ab-
 sence of technological change, all industries
 under Case 1 are nonviable when individual
 tariff protection is removed.
 The analysis of measured positive value-
 added in world prices under Cases 2, 3 and
 4 is analogous to the analysis of negative
 value-added, i.e. the industry may or may
 not be viable under world prices, no matter
 whether measured value-added in terms of
 world prices is positive or negative.
 fIl. A Special Case: Leontief Technology
 Up to now, we have assumed a variable-
 input technology. What about a Leontief
 technology, which excludes substitution
 between inputs? It can easily be shown
 that (i) all industries with measured neg-
 ative value-added in world prices will be
 nonviable under world prices, for all four
 cases of Section I; (ii) all industries with
 measured positive value-added in world
 prices will be nonviable without individual
 tariff-protection (Case 1) except in the tri-
 vial case of complete tariff redundancy or
 unimputed monopoly gains; and (iii) in
 Cases 2, 3, and 4, all industries with mea-
 sured positive value-added may, or may
 not, be viable under world prices, depend-
 ing on relative material-factor prices, as in
 the case of variable input technology.
 Thus the Leotief technology case ap-
 pears as a special case of our earlier anal-
 ysis. We may note that it is this special
 case which, implicitly for the most part,
 underlies much of the discussion on neg-
 ative value-added. The natural question
 arises: how appropriate or inappropriate is
 the assumption of a fixed coefficient tech-
 nology? The proper response to this is, that
 it is an empirical question, and that to pro-
 ceed to policy measures solely on an as-
 sumption may be highly misleading. In-
 deed, one can argue plausibly that the high
 incidence (see Soligo and Stern) of mea-
 sured negative value-added in world prices
 creates a good presumption of a variable
 input technology unless, of course, all such
 industries did not exist prior to the intro-
 duction of the tariff structure.7 The argu-
 ment is self-evident: if the industries ex-
 isted, i.e. were viable, in the pre-tariff
 situation, then negative value-added in
 world prices cannot occur in the post-tariff
 situation if no factor substitution is al-
 lowed and if, of course, no technical retro-
 gression occurs.
 It seems much more satisfactory, there-
 fore, to treat the Leontief technology case
 as no more than a special case and to rest
 the analysis8 on the safer ground of some
 variability in factor substitution.
 III. Factor Price Adjustments
 In the discussion of Cases 2, 3, and 4 in
 the preceding sections, one of the key ele-
 ments was the behavior of the relative
 price of materials to domestic factors in
 going from one tariff policy to another.
 This question is ignored or else treated in
 partial equilibrium terms in the literature
 on value-added and on the theory of effec-
 tive protection.
 To highlight the nature of the problem
 we are dealing with, consider the following
 I Note that this argument applies only to Cases 2, 3,
 and 4 where factor price adjustments are admitted.
 As a referee pointed out, this proposition will be dif-
 ficult to test in less developed countries where many
 industries come into being after protection is granted.
 8 I have extended the analysis to cover situations of
 nonconstant returns to scale, monopoly, factor market
 distortions, and learning effects, but space limitations
 prohibit their iniclusion here.
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 simple model with two sectors; an import-
 able dependent on labor and an imported
 input, and an exportable dependent on
 labor, imported input (material), as well as
 on a fixed factor, G. The introduction of the
 fixed factor is to prevent complete speciali-
 zation since labor is the only other pri-
 mary factor. We abstract from problems of
 tariff redundancy, monopoly, nonconstant
 returns to scale, and factor market dis-
 tortions.
 Let
 7 Z = Z1(Ll, M1) importable
 Z2 = Z2(L2, G, M2) exportable
 Setting unit cost equal to price:
 (8) alLW + almPm = P1
 a2Lw + a2mPm + a2,r = P2
 where aij= amount of input j used per unit
 of output i.
 Totally differentiating (8), dividing
 through by the respective output price,
 and letting
 - dPl aijX i=1,2;
 P1 - and Cs,-,
 P1 Pi j = Lg,ym}
 as X w,P.,r;
 da,1
 aii
 In general, the ^ denotes proportionate
 change.
 We get:
 C1LV) + C1L61L + CIMPm + C1m1,n = P1
 (9) C2Li?) + C2Ld2L + C2mPm + C2md2m
 C2U9 + C2ga2, = P2
 A necessary cost minimizing condition is:
 wdalL + Pmdaim = 0
 wda2L + Pmda2m + rda2, = 0
 which become, in terms of Ci, factor shares
 in unit costs:
 (10) C11L + Cimalm = 0
 C2Ld2L + C2m2m d? C2a 12g 0
Therefore, (9) becomes:
 C1LZ + CimPm = P1
 C2LV +- C2mPm + C2gf - P2
 Now consider a differential tariff struc-
 ture such as we examined in our earlier
 discussion, with a tariff on the final im-
 portable and no tariff on the intermediate
 good or exports, i.e. PA>O, P2=Pm-=O.
 From equation- (11) we get immediately:
 P1
 (12) zV=->0
 ClL
 Since the denominator is the share of
 labor in unit cost of production of the final
 importable, it is necessarily less than one.
 Hence the wage rate rises more than pro-
 portionately when a tariff is imposed on
 the final importable. Conversely, going
 from a tariff situation to one of free trade,
 the wage rate will fall more than propor-
 tionately. Since Pm, the material price is
 fixed, this means that if the final import-
 able industry does not operate on a Leon-
 tief technology, it may well display nega-
 tive value-added in world prices but yet
 may be viable when allowed to adjust to
 world prices.
 In terms of a more general model where
 both final goods industries depend on two
 domestic factors, say, capital and labor, as
 well as on imported material, wages and
 rents move in opposite direction, depend-
 ing on capital-labor ratios. (A. H. H. Tan,
 1969a.) Thus there is both substitution
 towards and away from material input.
 Nevertheless, in terms of our value-added
 measure, the critical point is that the two-
 way substitution is not exactly offsetting,
 i.e., we would observe (in a non-Leontief
 technology), a net substitution either away
 from or towards material input. The impli-
 cation of this is that industries displaying
 TAN: THEORY OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 113
 either positive or negative value-added
 may be viable under free trade if the net
 substitution is towards the domestic
 factors. If, instead, the net substitution is
 towards material inputs, then, in the
 absence of tariff redundancy or monopoly,
 the industries would go out of existence
 under free trade.
 IV. EP Rates and Maximum Factor Rewards
 The first claim of EP theory, that it
 provides a measure of the maximum pro-
 portionate increase in factor rewards
 permitted by a tariff structure, as com-
 pared to a free trade regime, can be readily
 disposed of. In the first place, the theory
 does not apply to cases where industries
 are viable in the tariff situation but not in
 the pre-tariff situation. However, even
 when industries are viable in both situa-
 tions, there are difficulties.
 Consider Case 1 of Section 1: quite
 clearly, according protection solely to a
 small industry cannot affect the remunera-
 tion to domestic factors. What is likely to
 happen is either unimputed gains to the
 entrepreneur, who may or may not be con-
 sidered a domestic factor, or the tariff is re-
 dundant.
 What about Case 2 of a small industry,
 which is confronted with a broadly similar
 differential structure of protection across
 many such industries? The effect on do-
 mestic factor rewards must be analyzed
 from a general equilibrium vantage-point.
 The EP interpretation is clearly invalid for
 this case since, to a small industry, factor
 prices are given.
 The EP interpretation fits our Case 3,
 the large industry case, if no tariff changes
 elsewhere are being considered. However,
 the latter is clearly not the premise of EP
 theory since more than one EP rate is
 considered. It is clear that EP theory
 deals with our Case 4, the large industry
 case with simultaneous changes in tariffs in
 many industries, but in partial equilibrium
 terms. From a purely partial equilibrium
 standpoint, in order to attract additional
 resources, the industry must offer increas-
 ng factor prices. We note that EP theory
 implicitly imputes all the increase in
 product price (due to protection) to the
 return on the domestic factor(s).
 V. EP Rates and Resource Allocation
 The second goal of EP theory is to in-
 dicate the resource-allocative effects of a
 tariff structure. The measured rates are
 ordered on a scale through zero:
 ... if four activities producing traded
 goods can be ordered along a scale A, B,
 C, D, in ascending order of effective
 rates, we can say that output of A must
 fall and of D must rise and that resources
 will be pulled from A to B and from A
 and B to C; but without more precise
 information about production-substitu-
 tion elasticities, we cannot say whether
 the outputs of B and C will rise or fall.
 [Corden 1966, p. 224]
 The quotation above indicates that only
 the ranking of EP rates matter and that
 resources will move from sectors with lower
 EP rates to those with higher, since EP
 rates are interpreted to represent increases
 in the rates of remuneration to domestic
 factors. We shall demonstrate below that
 EP rates predict only a particular direc-
 tion of resource flows whereas general
 equilibrium analysis, with variable input
 coefficients, indicates that flows contrary
 to EP prediction are possible. Two ex-
 amples are provided: one, where there is
 a uniform tariff (subsidy) on final goods;
 and two, where one final sector has a
 higher nominal tariff than the other and
 there is no tariff on material imports. As
 will become apparent, the crux of the
 matter is that EP rates depend not only on
 nominal tariffs but also on value-added.
 The latter is a function of technology as
 well as relative output-input prices.
 Consider again the simple model of
 Section III above. We shall present two
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 cases to show the ambiguity of EP theory.
 In Case A, the tariff on the final import-
 able is equal to the subsidy on the ex-
 portable. In Case B, the tariff on the final
 importable is less than the export subsidy.
 There is no tariff on material imports in
 either case.
 Case A
 Under a uniform tariff and subsidy on
 the final goods,
 P1= P2 and Pm= .
 From equation (11) we get, again, that
 wages increase as in equation (12).
 The rental on the fixed factor, (G), may,
 however increase or decrease:
 From equations (11) and (12),
 (13) P = P1(CIL - C2L) K 0 as C1L Z C2L
 2gC1L
 To return to the mainstream of the
 discussion, we look next at factor endow-
 ment.
 (14) alLZl + a2LZ2 = L
 a2gZ2 G
 Totally differentiating equation (14) and
 converting to proportionate terms, letting
 aijZ- fraction of supply of factor
 F,j= , =
 aiZi j used in sector i
 and noting
 E 'i = 1 , Fi
 we get:
 (15) FIL91 + F1Ld1L + F2Ld2L + F2L2I2 0
 and
 F2022 + F29d29 = 0
 or
 22 = d2
 Next consider the production function
 Z2, from equation (7). By the linear
 homogeneity property, we can write:
 y L2 Al Z2= Gf2 ( y 4-
 Hence
 1 /L2 M2\
 - II'2 y )
 d27 G G
 Totally differentiating,
 (16) a-2 a2g [f2Ld (t) + f2md (A )]
 We know the partial derivatives, being
 marginal physical products, are positive,
 i.e. f2L, f2m >O. However, the total deriva-
 tives, d(L2/G) and d(M2/G), are dependent
 on relative input prices, Pm, r, and w.
 Pm is fixed; we know w always rises (equa-
 tion (12)) but r may rise or fall (equation
 (13)). In addition, in a three-input world,
 two of the inputs can be complements.
 Hence, in general, the two total deriva-
 tives on the right-hand side of (16) may
 take either sign. Therefore a'2 may take
 either sign. Returning to equation (15) we
 therefore see that Z2 may rise or fall, i.e.
 output of sector 2 may increase or diminish
 under a uniform tariff subsidy on final out-
 puts.
 Now let us look at what EP theory has
 to say. Suppose value-added in sector 2
 exceeds that in sector 1. Then, since EP
 rates are given by:
 (17) T,
 W *
 where ti=nominal tariff (subsidy) on
 sector i, it follows that Wii*=equilibriumt
 value-added in world prices in sector i.
 This implies T1 > T2, EP rate of sector 1
 exceeds EP rate of sector 2 even though
 both enjoy a uniform tari;ff/subsidy. Ac-
 cording to Corden, therefore, resources will
 flow from sector 2 to sector 1. But we have
 TAN: THEORY OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 115
 seen that this is not necessarily the case in
 general equilibrium with input substitu-
 tion. The Corden approach9 totally ignores
 the general equilibrium role of material im-
 ports, factor-material substitution, and has no
 resource availability constraint.
 Case B
 For the second case, let t1 <t2, i.e. let the
 export subsidy exceed the final import
 tariff. Then A>P1. The wage-rate, w,
 rises as before (equation (12)). However,
 the rental, (r), on the fixed factor, (G) is
 now given by:
 C1LP2 - C2LP1
 ( 18) C1LC2g
 as C1LP2 t C2LP1
 Again, r can either rise or fall. The same
 arguments in Case A apply, i.e. sector 2
 may either expand or contract.
 Even though tl< t2, EP rates may be
 such that T1> T2 as in Case A, if value-
 added in sector 2 exceeds that in sector 1
 sufficiently. Again, EP theory predicts a
 particular flow of resources, from sector 2 to
 sector 1, when the reverse flow is possible
 in general equilibrium and variable input
 proportions.
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